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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

8 March 1986

The Honorable James C. Miller III  
Director  
Office of Management and Budget  
Washington, D.C. 20503

Mr. Miller:

I know that you share my concern regarding the increasing threat to our national security posed by unauthorized disclosure of classified intelligence information. The compromise of our intelligence sources, both human and technical, has placed lives in jeopardy and rendered expensive technical collection systems ineffective. Unfortunately, we have not been able to take effective steps to punish those who have violated their obligation to protect classified information and this has created the perception that nobody cares. We simply must restore discipline to the handling of sensitive information.


While there is no single solution to the problem of leaks, one step that can be taken is to enact legislation that would criminalize the reprehensible conduct of disclosing classified information to those outside government who are not authorized to receive it. Enactment of leaks legislation, combined with a vigorous effort to detect those who are engaged in disclosing classified information, will restore an element of risk to those who misuse classified information.

We have proposed leaks legislation as part of the draft Intelligence Authorization Bill for the past two years. Last year, objections were raised to the inclusion of leaks legislation in the Authorization Bill because the issue needed to be studied more closely and a consensus reached within the Executive Branch on whether we should attempt to enact leaks legislation. To date, I am not aware that any action has been taken to reach such a consensus.

This year we again proposed leaks legislation as part of the Authorization Bill. Once again, we were told that consideration of leaks legislation should be postponed. I do not believe we can continue to indefinitely postpone taking effective action. Too many of our nation's secrets have already been compromised to continue a business as usual attitude.

Given the exceedingly compressed time frame imposed on the authorization process by Gramm-Rudman, I do not want to jeopardize the rest of our FY 87 authorization bill because of another internal debate on this issue. Therefore, I reluctantly agree to the deletion of the leaks provisions from this year's bill. In return, I trust that OMB will support and facilitate the enactment of strong leaks legislation this year.

Sincerely,



John N. McMahon  
Acting Director of Central Intelligence

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

25 MAR 1986

The Honorable Edwin Meese, III  
The Attorney General  
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Ed:

I know that you share my concern regarding the increasing threat to our national security posed by unauthorized disclosure of classified intelligence information. The compromise of our intelligence sources, both human and technical, has placed lives in jeopardy and rendered expensive technical collection systems ineffective. Unfortunately, we have not been able to take effective steps to punish those who have violated their obligation to protect classified information and this has created the perception that nobody cares. We simply must restore discipline to the handling of sensitive information.

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We have proposed leaks legislation as part of the draft Intelligence Authorization Bill for the past two years. Last year, the Department raised objections to including leaks legislation in the Authorization Bill because the issue needed to be studied more closely and a consensus reached within the Executive Branch on whether we should attempt to enact leaks legislation. To date, I am not aware that any action has been taken to reach such a consensus.

This year we again proposed leaks legislation as part of the Authorization Bill. Once again, the Department questioned the need for the legislation and raised objections to the substance of our proposed bill. Last week, in a letter to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence reluctantly agreed to the deletion of the leaks provision from the Authorization Bill.

I do not believe we can continue to indefinitely postpone taking effective action. Too many of our nation's secrets have already been compromised to continue a business as usual attitude. Because this issue can only be decided at the highest levels of the Administration, I intend to press for a meeting of the NSPG at the earliest possible date to address the question of whether the Administration is willing to work for enactment of leaks legislation. For the reasons set forth above, I am convinced that new legislation is a key first step in tackling this problem, and I hope I can count on your active support in accomplishing this goal. I am sure that we can work together to prepare effective legislation. I look forward to hearing from you on this matter in the very near future.

Sincerely,

/s/ William J. Casey

William J. Casey  
Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Secretary of Defense  
Secretary of State  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
Director of Management and Budget

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MAR 25 1986

B

Honorable John N. McMahon  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. McMahon:

Thank you for your letter of March 8th in which you informed me of your decision to delete the proposed legislation on unauthorized disclosure from the Administration's 1987 Intelligence Authorization Bill. Your decision allowed us to quickly clear this proposed bill for transmittal to the Congress to support the President's 1987 Budget.

I share your concern regarding the national security threat posed by the unauthorized disclosure of classified information. At the same time, I am aware of the concern of others that careful study of this type of legislation is needed to allow the Administration to reach an informed decision. The Assistant Attorney General, John R. Bolton, stated in the Justice Department's views letter of February 20th on your draft bill that Justice will undertake such a study with a view toward subsequently working with intelligence community representatives to draft an appropriate provision. I suggest that you work directly with Assistant Attorney General Bolton to develop a timetable for completing these efforts preliminary to policy review and decision.

OMB supports and stands ready to assist the process of careful study and drafting of an appropriate statute that can be presented for review to senior administration policy officials. Please keep us advised on progress toward this review and decision.

I am also forwarding a copy of our correspondence to Fred Fielding to ensure that his office is fully aware of your continued concern.

Sincerely yours,

*Jim*

James C. Miller III  
Director

c: Fred Fielding  
(with attachment)

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## SPECIAL REPORT



ARTHUR GRACE—NEWSWEEK



PETER TURNLEY FOR NEWSWEEK

The best of enemies: *Neither side was intimidated*

# Kaddafi's Crusade

The Libyan leader threatens new terrorist attacks after Reagan steams through his 'line of death'



The Navy's 'Terrorist Busters' at work: *The men on* 60


**H**is audience was small and relatively subdued, but Muammar Kaddafi managed to work himself into a fine frenzy. "We humiliated America and its forces," he told the crowd gathered at the Bab al Aziziya barracks in Tripoli. Kaddafi boasted that his "line of death" had repelled the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Gulf of Sidra. He claimed that his missiles had shot down three American warplanes, "whose six pilots are now feeding the fish." He maintained that his forces had recovered a dud missile fired by the Americans. "We are going to hand it over to the Russians," he gloated. He dismissed Ronald Reagan as "a trivial and futile actor" and bragged that "America fears Libya." When Kaddafi finally finished, Libyan soldiers dragged out a terrified cow with "Reakn" painted on its side. One of the men slit its throat with a knife. Then, as the animal thrashed out its life, the soldiers dipped their hands into the wound and danced around in the blood.

By American reckoning, it was Kaddafi whose ox was gored last week. U.S. warships steamed across the "line of death" into what Libya regards as territorial waters and stayed there, unharmed, for 75 hours. When Libya fired surface-to-air missiles at American planes, the Sixth Fleet replied with missiles of its own, silencing the air-defense battery. When Libyan patrol boats approached the fleet, bombs and missiles drove them off, sinking at least two. The American armada—three giant aircraft carriers and 24 other ships—had come to keep the sea lanes open and to punish Kaddafi for his sponsorship of international terrorism. The dual mission accomplished, it sailed away five days before the announced end of the exercise, with Reagan offering "a hearty 'well done'."


That might not be the end of it, however. By barging into the Gulf of Sidra, Reagan gave Kaddafi a bloody nose, but there was no sign that the volatile Libyan leader had been persuaded to get out of the terrorism

business. On the contrary, Libya exhorted its fellow Arabs to form "suicide squads" and to hurl "human bombs" at American targets in the region. Already, Kaddafi had begun to mobilize a counterattack by his allies and protégés in the vast underworld of international terrorism (page 25). "America is our target," announced the Palestinian faction run by Abu Nidal, who was blamed for the atrocities at the Rome and Vienna airports last Christmas. Reagan himself warned about "intensive Libyan preparations" for a campaign of violence against Americans. "The United States will not be intimidated by new threats of terrorism," the president promised. So far, most Americans seemed to agree. In a NEWSWEEK Poll (page 23), 63 percent of the people questioned said last week's attack on Libya was worthwhile, even if it leads to more terrorism against Americans.

And it probably will. Senior American officials, intelligence analysts and diplo-



on: board the aircraft carrier USS Saratoga knew exactly why they were poised just north of the Gulf of Sidra PETER TURNLEY FOR NEWSWEEK



A carefully calibrated response: Weinberger briefs the press on Operation Prairie Fire THOMPSON - SIPA SPECIAL FEATURES


matic sources in Washington have told NEWSWEEK of mounting evidence that Kaddafi is preparing a crusade against American citizens and facilities, mostly in Western Europe and the Middle East. His bag of dirty tricks includes the following:

- Highly classified CIA reports warn that Kaddafi's agents have had "no fewer than 35" American targets under surveillance overseas. The list ranges from the offices of American companies to the headquarters of the Sixth Fleet and the homes of its top officers in Naples. President Reagan also has been told that Libyan hit squads are tailing CIA station chiefs in the region.

- Last Wednesday a message was sent from Tripoli to Libyan agents in Paris, Belgrade and Geneva, ordering them to "prepare to carry out the plan." Similar messages were sent to Kaddafi's agents in Rome, Berlin and Madrid.

- A defector from a Libyan hit squad has told the CIA about a plot against the life of an American diplomat in Europe. The de-





**Arsenal of democracy:** Sidewinder air-to-air missiles (foreground) and 'cluster' bombs stockpiled for action aboard the Saratoga


factor, a North African who was recruited by Libyan agents in Western Europe, has passed a series of lie-detector tests and is still in U.S. custody.

■ Two Libyan agents in the Lebanese Army were ordered last week to attack U.S. Embassy personnel in Beirut. American officials believe that U.S. buildings in the Lebanese capital are now safe from car-bomb attacks. But they worry that assassins might attack Americans with rocket-propelled grenades.

■ In recent weeks Kaddafi has intensified his efforts to recruit European and Palestinian hit men in hopes of shifting the blame away from Libya. One Palestinian was enlisted to help carry out an attack on a U.S. diplomatic mission in Western Europe. The plot was uncovered when Yasir Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, tipped off the United States through a third party. Arafat didn't want his own Al Fatah to be blamed.

■ To keep Washington in what one source calls "a state of high anxiety," the Libyans are planning a psychological-warfare campaign in Europe and the Middle East, including telephoned bomb threats. "We think they're really going to yank our chain," says an American official. Libya also is trying to stir up demonstrations at U.S. embassies in Sudan and two other African countries. Apparently the Libyans hope that the demonstrators will run amok and sack the embassies.

The targeted embassies and other Americans in danger overseas have been warned, and across Europe and the Middle East governments are tightening up security.



**Moscow was warned:** Soviet destroyer (foreground) tracks a U.S. aircraft carrier

Similar steps are being taken in many American cities and airports, and the 3,500 Libyans who live in the United States are being watched. Some of the precautions were taken before last week's action in the Gulf of Sidra and have already begun to pay off. In February an Italian soldier and a free-lance cameraman were arrested in Sicily and accused of giving secrets to the Libyans, possibly in connection with a plot against Americans.

Intelligence analysts aren't sure when Kaddafi's new terror campaign will begin, if it does at all. Some experts argue that he will strike quickly in order to reaffirm his manhood after the Gulf of Sidra incursion. Others believe he will wait two or three months, giving himself time to put together an elaborate campaign—and giving Americans time to drop their guard. Robert Kupperman of Georgetown University in Washington predicts that Kaddafi will hold off for a couple of months. Then, he

says, "we're going to see attacks against Americans at airports, on the Via Veneto, at train stations. There will be attacks against individuals—American officials living abroad and tourists—and against American businesses. We're in for terrible trouble ahead."

But Kaddafi is as unpredictable as he is dangerous. According to several sources, a frequently updated CIA report on his mental state claims that he uses hallucinogens to expand his mind. Kaddafi also is said to be preoccupied with a girlfriend in Western Europe, flying off in a private plane to visit her almost every week. Whether or not those stories are true, Kaddafi sometimes doesn't seem to make sense, even to people who share his cultural background. NEWSWEEK has learned that one impeccable source who conferred with Kaddafi last Tuesday told American officials that he found the Libyan leader "disoriented and incomprehensible."

If Kaddafi is caught sponsoring attacks on Americans, the Reagan administration promises a swift and strong response. No final decisions have been made, in part because American retaliation will depend on what Kaddafi does. Officials have told **NEWSWEEK**, however, that most of Reagan's advisers support Secretary of State George Shultz's longstanding call for reprisals the next time around, not just against terrorist camps but against Libyan military and economic targets as well. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Adm. William Crowe, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are still reluctant to use military power except against specific terrorist targets. But Donald Regan, the White House chief of staff, John Poin-dexter, the president's national-security adviser, and CIA Director William Casey support Shultz's contention that further Libyan-sponsored terrorism should be answered with devastating attacks.

So far most of Libyan industry does not appear on any U.S. target list; nor have plans been drawn up to bomb Kaddafi's command bunker or the barracks where he lives. But American targeters already are prepared to attack a wide range of Libyan military facilities and the training camps allegedly used by terrorists. And if Kaddafi gives them sufficient provocation, American warplanes will go after the oil pipelines and storage facilities that are crucial to Libya's hard-pressed economy. "The next act of terrorism," promises a top U.S. official, "will bring the hammer down."

**Going it alone:** Washington began to tighten the screws on Kaddafi early this year. After the murder of 15 air travelers in Rome and Vienna, Reagan ordered American residents to leave Libya, and he imposed a trade embargo on the country. Many American allies were unenthusiastic about the sanctions, which seemed likely to do Kaddafi little harm. Preparing to go it alone, the administration drafted a long-term plan for additional economic and political moves against Kaddafi. It also started to look for an excuse to take military action against him (**NEWSWEEK**, Jan. 20).

Why Libya? The administration has long recognized that Syria and Iran are even more deeply involved with terrorism than Kaddafi is. The Abu Nidal group, for instance, could be traced more directly to Syria than to Libya. But Syria and Iran are difficult, well-armed targets, and the State Department regards Syrian President Hafez Assad as the essential mediator in Lebanon. So Libya became the prime U.S. target. Whatever his precise standing may be among the patrons of terrorism, Kaddafi deserved to be punished. "He harbors terrorists, trains them, supplies them and encourages them," Shultz said in Rome last week. "You don't have to be Sherlock Holmes to figure it out." Kaddafi also con-

## Fearing Trouble: A Newsweek Poll

Most Americans think last week's action against Libya was justified, but they fear a terrorist response. And there are grave doubts about aiding the contras.

### Gulf of Sidra Attacks

Do you think U.S. attacks against Libyan ships and military sites were justified or not?

75% Justified  
15% Not justified

Some people think that U.S. naval maneuvers in the Gulf of Sidra were a deliberate attempt to provoke an attack from Libya. Do you agree or disagree?

43% Agree  
46% Disagree

\*ANSWERS FROM THE 50 PERCENT OF ALL RESPONDENTS WHO HAD HEARD OR READ ABOUT THE U.S. RETALIATORY ATTACKS.

### Fears of Terrorism

Following the U.S. attack on Libya, are you more afraid of terrorist acts against Americans because Kaddafi will retaliate, or less afraid because the attack taught Kaddafi a lesson?

64% More afraid  
26% Less afraid

Do you think the U.S. attack on Libya was worth doing even if it risks more terrorist attacks against Americans?

63% Worth it  
26% Not worth it

If you had the opportunity to travel overseas this summer, would you take the trip or refuse it because of the threat of terrorism?

34% Take trip  
61% Refuse it

### Aid to the Contras

Do you think giving U.S. military aid to the contra forces fighting the communist government in Nicaragua will eventually lead to U.S. troops being sent there to help in the fight? Or do you think such aid will permit the contras to carry on without the help of U.S. troops?

44% U.S. troops will be sent  
33% Permit contras to carry on  
23% Don't know

Which is of greater concern to you today: the presence of a communist government as close to the United States as Nicaragua, or the possibility that U.S. troops will become involved in a war in Central America?


34% Communist government  
54% U.S. troops involved

### The Wise Use of Military Force

Do you think President Reagan makes wise use of military forces to solve foreign-policy problems, or do you think the president is too quick to employ U.S. forces?

	Wise	Too quick
Current	56%	32%
2/84	40%	52%
10/83 (After Grenada)	43%	47%

For this **NEWSWEEK** Poll, The Gallup Organization interviewed a representative national sample of 606 adults by telephone March 26 and 27. The margin of error is plus or minus 5 percentage points. Some "Don't know" responses omitted. The **NEWSWEEK** Poll © 1986 by **NEWSWEEK**, Inc.



Anticipating reprisals: Security guards search a car at a NATO base near Naples

tinued to alarm Washington with his meddling in Chad, where his forces are supporting rebels against the government, and Sudan, where he is supporting the government against some rebels. Even Libya presented problems as a target, however. It was difficult to locate the terrorist camps and to know when they were occupied by specific groups, such as Abu Nidal's. And there was a high risk of killing Libyan bystanders.

Then, in late January, Kaddafi gave the Americans the pretext they were looking for: he proclaimed his "line of death" across the Gulf of Sidra (map). "That line is manifestly illegal under international law, so the United States had a perfect right to cross it, which means a perfect right to fire back if Kaddafi were to attack us," said a senior administration official. The freedom-of-navigation issue also solved the targeting problem; the Americans could fire at Libyan missile sites, aircraft or warships that threatened them. In early February the planning for Operation Prairie Fire began, and soon Washington's resolve was hardened by the CIA reports that Libyan agents were shadowing U.S. diplomats in Europe and the Middle East. By then the Navy had begun to put pressure on Kaddafi with unannounced incursions into the airspace over the Gulf of Sidra. Sources told *Newsweek* that carrier-based American planes crossed the line for 32 consecutive days, forcing Kaddafi to keep his air defenses on constant alert.

**Moral heights:** The decision to go ahead with Prairie Fire was made at a meeting in the White House on March 14. The toughest issue was how to retaliate if Kaddafi fired on the fleet. Shultz favored swift attacks on Libyan oilfields and terrorist camps, while Weinberger argued that the U.S. response should be proportional to the Libyan aggression. Shultz wanted targets to be selected in advance, while Crowe insisted that the Sixth Fleet commander, Vice Adm. Frank Kelso, should be allowed to make the final decisions on the spot. Poindexter had the swing vote, and he engineered a compromise: Kelso could defend himself, but if Kaddafi launched an all-out assault the fleet would retaliate against a graduated, preselected list of Libyan military and economic targets, with Washington approving each escalation. Later, officials agreed that Poindexter's compromise allowed the United States to retain the moral high ground by waiting until the Libyans opened fire and then responding in kind.

Then, *Newsweek* has learned, the na-

tional-security adviser dropped a stitch. After agreeing to brief congressional leaders on Prairie Fire, Poindexter failed to follow through, apparently because it slipped his mind. The Hill went unbriefed, even as Under Secretary of State Michael Armacost called in the Soviet chargé d'affaires to tell him what was going to happen—and to warn Moscow that U.S. forces would strike back if Libya opened fire.

Ronald Reagan himself took little part in the March 14 meeting. "You almost got the impression that he wasn't paying attention," an aide recalls. But at the end Reagan recapped the proceedings and went over the


station outside the Gulf of Sidra, and they knew what was likely to happen next. The skipper, Capt. Jerry Unruh, sported a name tag on his breast pocket that read: "Terrorist Buster." "One of the men gave it to me, and I promised I'd wear it," he told *Newsweek's* Theodore Stanger, who visited the carrier as Prairie Fire began. By then the ship's store had sold out its supply of "Terrorist Buster" T-shirts (\$4.50 each).

**'Standoff' range:** After lunch on Monday the Libyans fired their first SAM-5 missiles, and in response, American warplanes hurtled off the flight decks of the Saratoga, the Coral Sea and the America.

For nearly 24 hours they continued their scheduled training flights and fought when they had to, efficiently but cautiously. American electronics jammed the Libyan defenses, and the Sixth Fleet fired its missiles and dropped its bombs from the relative safety of "standoff" range. There were a few glitches. The fleet never did determine exactly how many missiles the Libyans had fired or how many Libyan patrol boats were sunk or how many Libyans had been killed (150 was the best guess). In addition, U.S. officials worried that Kaddafi might have been telling the truth when he said he had recovered a dud "HARM" missile, which could be an intelligence bonanza for Moscow. When the first action reports got back to the White House, however, Ronald Reagan's first question was: "Any casualties?" None, he was told. "Good!" the president exclaimed, pounding the arm of his chair.

Elsewhere, the incursion drew a mixed reaction. Congress was more or less acquiescent. Some of the European allies regretted the violence, but not too heatedly, while others happily cloaked themselves in the fig leaf of free navigation. As expected, Arab governments complained, moderates and radicals alike, but some of the protests had a hollow ring. "People keep coming up to us in private and saying, 'Great,'" reported a U.S. diplomat in the Middle East, where Kaddafi is more despised than admired. The final verdict on Operation Prairie Fire will come in the weeks and months ahead, when Kaddafi launches his next terror campaign—or decides not to risk it. If there is a new round of terror, the ruthless friends of Muammar Kaddafi will find that the stakes are higher the next time around.

RUSSELL WATSON with JOHN WALTON and JOHN BARRY in Washington, TONY CLIFTON and RUTH MARSHALL in Tripoli and bureau reports



Burnt offering: A Libyan patrol boat after a hit by a U.S. missile

rules of engagement in some detail. "It was pretty obvious that he knew what he was going to do long before he sat down," says the aide. When the action began last week, administration spokesmen insisted that freedom of navigation was the only issue. "The purpose is not to put Kaddafi into his box, [although] that's where he belongs," Shultz said during a visit to Turkey. "The purpose is to exert the U.S. right to conduct naval and air exercises in every part of the globe." But aides confirm that Reagan has a visceral dislike for Kaddafi and wants to overthrow him, just as he hopes to depose Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega. "We wanted to provoke Kaddafi into responding so we could stick it to him," says one participant in the March 14 meeting. "And we knew he would oblige us."

The men on board the aircraft carrier Saratoga knew exactly why they were on

SOLE APPEARED  
PAGE A1

WASHINGTON POST  
2 April 1985

## One Option Involved Extensive Bombing

By Bob Woodward  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Eight months of secret U.S. efforts to win Egyptian approval for a U.S.-Egyptian military operation designed to overthrow Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi appear to have foundered following public disclosure and rejection of the plan by Cairo, informed sources said yesterday.

Still, there were contradictory reports yesterday on whether the plan had been abandoned by the United States. Officials were quoted this week in Cairo as saying that the Egyptian government had rejected three U.S. overtures in recent months for a joint attack on Libya. U.S. sources, however, said that secret discussions in Cairo in February were productive and the joint planning was continuing.

One option of the plan called for U.S. military air operations in coordination with Egypt, which would attack across the 600-mile Libyan-Egyptian border. U.S. support was to include extensive bombing in what one source said would have been the most ambitious and aggressive foreign policy decision in the Reagan administration.

President Reagan authorized the planning and in the last eight months sent two high-level emissaries to Egypt for secret military planning, according to informed sources. One emissary, Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter, now Reagan's national security affairs adviser, headed a team of military planners that visited Cairo late last summer around Labor Day; a senior Pentagon general assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued the efforts this February in meetings that one source said "went very well."

Reagan never gave final approval to carry out the military plan even if Cairo had assented and sources disagreed yesterday about how close it came to realization. "It was really a plan for a surprise attack on Libya

in conjunction with Egypt, nothing less," one source said.

The Defense Department last year also slowed its planning when strategists concluded that as many as six divisions, or 90,000 men, would have to be used if direct U.S. military involvement was required.

"The whole attitude of the Pentagon study was," said one source, "Do we want a war with Libya?" Libya's armed forces include 73,000 regular troops and 535 combat aircraft.

The joint U.S.-Egyptian military discussions were one of the most closely held undertakings in the Reagan White House, sources said. "A small group of mostly senior advisers took the war-making power unto themselves," one source critical of the planning said recently. "They had insufficient understanding of the Middle East . . . It could have been a disaster."

Even while disagreeing over details of the plan and its current status, a number of sources agreed that it was not to be executed until there was a clear-cut military or terrorist provocation by Libya and Qaddafi, its erratic leader.

One part of the U.S. plan called for Egypt to attack Libya on the ground, occupying perhaps half the country. Then, at Egyptian request, the United States would step in to assist. Another scenario suggested that once in control of half of Libya, Egypt would have sufficient leverage to force Qaddafi out of power.

In another alternative, U.S. bombers and tactical fighters would strike major Libyan military installations before the Egyptian attack or in concert with Egypt's attack.

Despite Egyptian hostility toward Qaddafi, the sources said, some U.S. strategists believed that Arab solidarity likely would have prevailed, preventing Egypt's participation with the United States in any large-scale attack against an Arab neighbor unless Libya attacked first.

Some administration officials have described the plan as "precautionary" and a "contingency." Several sources have said that the U.S. Navy exercise last week in Libya's Gulf of Sidra—code-named "Operation Prairie Fire"—may have satisfied the administration's goal of

sending a message of U.S. resolve to Qaddafi. Three U.S. aircraft carrier groups retaliated against a Libyan missile attack by sinking at least two Libyan patrol boats and bombing a missile radar site.

In December and January when The Washington Post learned of some of the secret planning with the Egyptians, certain details about ongoing military plans were omitted from articles after a request from senior administration officials. On Dec. 21, The Post reported that a high-level emissary for anti-Libyan military contingency planning had been sent to the Middle East. In a Jan. 24 article, Egypt was first identified as a key participant in the secret planning. Poindexter was not identified as one of the emissaries to Cairo until an article last Wednesday in The Post in the wake of the Gulf of Sidra action.

Poindexter's role as the planning emissary to Cairo was a closely held secret and apparently triggered a response in Egypt.

Ibrahim Nafeh, editor in chief of the semiofficial Al-Ahram and a man close to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, wrote on Monday that "the United States has attempted more than once to join in an action with Egypt against Libya." He cited three such attempts and said that Egypt had rejected the proposal each time.

The Washington Times yesterday said that administration sources confirmed these reported rejections.

Well-placed administration sources, however, said the Egyptian reaction was not outright rejection and that during the February meetings in Cairo a senior Defense Department planner reported positive results. The White House had no comment yesterday.

There is apparent division in the Egyptian government about the U.S. plan, and one source said that Egyptian Defense Minister Abdul-Halim Abu Ghazala, a defense attache in Washington during the mid-1970s, was more inclined to at least listen to U.S. plans.

U.S. relations with Egypt were strained last October after the hijacking of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro, when U.S. jets intercepted an Egyptian airliner carrying the four hijackers. An article the next month in The Washington Post detailing a covert CIA plan to at-

tempt to undermine the Qaddafi regime—which has been only a portion of the administration's anti-Qaddafi plans—also increased Egyptian fears that any joint undertaking against Qaddafi with the United States would become public.

Abu Ghazala was apparently upset about the CIA disclosure, according to an intelligence report, and was told by the U.S. embassy in Cairo that the story would not arouse much controversy because nearly everyone in the United States favored unseating Qaddafi.

The seriousness with which the anti-Libyan planning was undertaken by the White House is illustrated by one written analysis about probable Soviet reaction to a military strike against Libya prior to the November summit meeting. The analysis concluded that the Soviets would keep their distance, and any U.S.-Egyptian move would not hurt the summit.

As details of the plan were dis-

closed to Pentagon and intelligence analysts over the last eight months, serious objections began to surface.

No one in the White House had fully grasped the extent to which Qaddafi, who has ruled since 1969, has a hold on the Libyan population of 3 million people, according to one informed source. Through a series of so-called revolutionary committees, Qaddafi has organized and armed the population, in some instances down to individual blocks in the Libyan capital of Tripoli. These people's committees are fiercely loyal to Qaddafi, according to some U.S. analysts.

The Pentagon, according to sources, was also concerned that the planning did not fully deal with the task of launching and coordinating such a military operation across the Atlantic.

"This wasn't Grenada," one source said, "though there were frequent references to it in the discussions."



30 March 1986

# U.S. Sends New Arms To Rebels

## Afghans, Angolans Get Stinger Missiles In Change of Policy

By David B. Ottaway  
and Patrick E. Tyler  
Washington Post Staff Writers

The Reagan administration, after hesitating for years to send sophisticated U.S. weapons to insurgent forces in the Third World, has begun supplying several hundred Stinger missiles covertly to anti-communist rebels in Angola and Afghanistan, informed sources said yesterday.

The decision, which has been closely held among the president's national security affairs advisers since it was made earlier this month, marks a major shift in U.S. policy. Shipments of top-of-the-line American arms to such insurgents had been barred in favor of furnishing largely Soviet- and Chinese-made weapons bought on the international arms market or from U.S. allies.

The change in policy is certain to broaden involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in Third World conflicts and appears likely to escalate the fighting in Afghanistan and Angola, where Soviet helicopter gunships have inflicted heavy casualties on rebels forces in the past year.

The shift occurred after activists in the Pentagon and the CIA, backed by conservatives in the Senate and elsewhere, overcame opposition by officials in the State Department, as well as some in the CIA. Opponents of the change long have argued that introduction of U.S.-made weapons into Third World conflicts escalates those struggles into U.S.-Soviet confrontations. Those situations pose

touchy problems for neighboring states attempting to maintain a neutral diplomatic posture while providing a route for U.S.-backed arms shipments.

Introduction of such weapons also makes it more difficult for the U.S. government to maintain a posture of "plausible deniability" of its involvement in such conflicts.

A White House spokesman said the administration had no comment on whether Stinger heat-seeking antiaircraft missiles have been provided to rebels in the two countries. Nor would he comment on reports that Stingers might also be sent to the U.S.-backed contras, or counterrevolutionaries, fighting the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.

The Stinger decision followed the Feb. 25 recommendation of an interagency committee made up of senior representatives from the State Department, CIA, Defense Department and the National Security Council staff. The committee, which meets periodically in the White House situation room or in Room 208 of the Old Executive Office Building, is charged with planning and coordinating all CIA covert paramilitary operations.

Over the past year, the interagency review of U.S. covert paramilitary operations concluded that Soviet-backed forces were employing more lethal weaponry and more aggressive tactics against mujahadeen rebels in Afghanistan and against the guerrilla army of Jonas Savimbi in Angola.

One intelligence estimate indicates that roughly one-third of Soviet special forces units, trained for counterinsurgency and night combat roles, have been deployed to Afghanistan where they have inflicted heavy casualties.

In Angola, a large column of Soviet-made tanks and armored vehicles backed by helicopter gunships and MiG21 and MiG23 jet fighters are poised for an offensive expected in the next 60 days to rid the Marxist central government of Savimbi's 10-year-old insurgency.

Rebels in both countries have been opposing the increased air threat with Soviet-made, shoulder-fired SA7 missiles and have complained that their range—less than two miles—is not sufficient to thwart "stand-off" attacks by heavily armored Soviet gunships. The

rebels also have complained about the reliability of Soviet SA7s, whose battery-driven electronics apparently are subject to frequent failure.

The Stinger, a state-of-the-art antiaircraft missile made by General Dynamics Corp. and supplied to only a few U.S. allies, is a far more lethal weapon than the SA7 the United States has been supplying to the Afghan rebels. The Stinger has a range of up to five miles and employs a supercooled sensor to lock on to aircraft heat emissions and is not easily fooled by decoy flares fired by Soviet helicopters.

In a letter to Reagan last month, a group of conservative senators estimated that Stingers could improve the "kill" capabilities of rebel forces facing Soviet military aircraft by three to ten times.

The CIA's clandestine service chief, Clair George, was described by sources as a strong proponent of the Stinger decision. George, who has been credited by CIA Director William J. Casey with rebuilding the agency's paramilitary arm, represented the CIA in the interagency deliberations. Casey visited Africa this month to meet with Savimbi and assure him that "effective" antiaircraft weapons were on the way, sources said.

The administration has been under pressure for months from conservative senators and political action groups to provide U.S. weapons to the anticommunist insurgents. The CIA and State Department have been criticized by these groups for dragging their feet.

A key event in the Stinger decision, according to sources, was a meeting on March 5 between Secretary of State George P. Shultz and a group of mostly conservative senators led by Senate Majority Leader Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.). During the 70-minute meeting in Dole's office, Shultz was pressed four different times to move quickly to provide Stingers to Angolan rebel leader Savimbi and to the Afghan mujahadeen resistance. Each time, according to sources, Shultz asked the senators: "Are you sure you want me to go back to Bill Casey and tell him you want Stingers?"

All nodded and said, "Yes," the sources said.

STINGER MISSILES SAID GOING TO ANGOLA AND AFGHANISTAN REBELS  
WASHINGTON

The Reagan administration has begun covertly supplying sophisticated Stinger missiles to anti-communist rebels in Angola and Afghanistan, according to a published report Sunday.

The decision to supply Stinger heat-seeking anti-aircraft missiles to the two insurgencies was made earlier this month and was kept secret among Reagan's national security advisers, said The Washington Post, quoting unidentified informed sources.

The weapons arrived in both countries last week, one source told the newspaper.

Spokesmen for the White House and State Department declined Saturday night to confirm or deny the report.

A spokesman for Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole said Saturday the covert aid was a topic of a March 5 meeting in Kansas senator's office, attended by other conservative senators and Secretary of State George Shultz.

The spokesman, Walt Riker, said the senators recommended 'that the freedom fighters be given effective aid that's going to help meet the reality of the opposition.'

He said he did not know if the Stinger "was the highlight" of the meeting, but The Post reported that the meeting was the key event leading to the Stinger decision. The senators pressed Shultz to supply Stingers to Angolan rebel leader Jonas Savimbi and the Afghan rebels, the newspaper said.

In the past, the United States has barred shipments of U.S.-made weapons to insurgent forces in the Third World, shipping instead Soviet- and Chinese-made weapons purchased on the international arms market, the newspaper said.

Proponents of that policy say introducing U.S.-made weapons into Third World conflicts broadens those struggles into U.S.-Soviet confrontations.

The Stinger, manufactured by the General Dynamics Corp., is far more lethal than the Soviet SA7, which the United States has been supplying Afghan rebels. The Stinger has a range of up to five miles and is capable of homing in on heat emissions from aircraft engines.

An administration official said the House and Senate intelligence oversight committees were notified of the Stinger decision late last week, The Post said.

The decision was recommended Feb. 25 by the so-called 208 Committee, an interagency group that meets in Room 208 of the Old Executive Office Building and coordinates CIA covert military operations, the newspaper said.

In the week following this meeting, top-secret presidential authority was given to ship several hundred Stingers to Angola and Afghanistan, according to sources. These shipments arrived during the past week, a source said.

Some conservatives have voiced private criticism of the Stinger decision, saying that the original proposal to help "freedom fighters" with American weapons called for thousands of U.S. anti-air and anti-tank missiles to be provided to U.S.-backed insurgents in Nicaragua and Cambodia as well as Afghanistan and Angola.

An administration official said the House and Senate intelligence oversight committees were notified of the Stinger decision late last week.



PAGE 3-A

WASHINGTON TIMES  
31 March 1986

# Angolan, Afghan guerrillas to receive Stinger missiles

By Bill Gertz  
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

An administration program to give Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to resistance fighters in Angola and Afghanistan is "well underway," an administration official confirmed yesterday.

The official said the program marks a significant step forward in the so-called "Reagan doctrine" of supporting anti-communist resistance forces around the world.

"With the delivery of those weapons, the psychological barrier against giving American weapons has been broken," the official said.

Even though some administration officials wanted to supply even more of the missiles than was approved, and wanted to send them to three additional resistance forces, the Stinger decision sets an important precedent for directly supplying American-made weapons, administration and congressional sources said.

One source said some officials were pushing also to supply the resistance fighters in Angola and Afghanistan with TOW [tube-launched, optically tracked, wire guided] anti-tank missiles.

Undersecretary of State Michael Armacost yesterday declined to comment on the Stinger shipments, citing the administration policy of not commenting on intelligence matters.

"I will say that the doctrine or disposition of the administration is to furnish support for indigenous sources of resistance to outposts of Soviet influence that were established in the 1970s through the direct or indirect use of their own military force," Mr. Armacost said on "Meet the Press," an NBC television program.

"The means that are used, those are matters that have to be judged in each individual case," he said. "But we provide that support for both practical and principled reasons."

Until the Stinger shipments were approved, U.S. officials opposed sending advanced American-made

weapons to resistance groups getting American support. Instead, obsolete or foreign-made weapons purchased on the international arms market were supplied, to keep United States involvement secret.

The shoulder-fired Stinger anti-aircraft missiles — made by General Dynamics — are infrared targeting devices that home in on jet or helicopter engines flying up to six miles away.

The Stingers are less vulnerable to Soviet electronic warfare countermeasures than the less accurate Soviet- and Chinese-made SAM-7 anti-aircraft rockets that have been supplied to the Afghan mujahideen fighters in the past. The SAM-7s reportedly have been ineffective against Soviet MiG jet fighters and Mi-24 Hind attack helicopters, also known as "flying tanks."

A major factor in the decision to ship the new missiles was the intensified Soviet effort to subdue the Afghan freedom fighters, said the administration official, who declined to be named.

He said the new missiles — which will require trainers to demonstrate how to use them — are a morale booster for anti-communist forces since Stingers are regarded as a "status symbol."

"The resistance is trying to match what the Soviets do. But often by the time they get the newer weapons, the Soviets have widened their defense perimeters," he said.

Another administration official, however, believes the decision to limit the number of Stingers to "several hundred" and only to Angola and Afghanistan sets back the Reagan doctrine.

The official said the approved Stinger program fell short of an original plan to deliver several thousand of the advanced missiles to support insurgencies in five Soviet-backed states.

"The original concept was that there were five countries with freedom fighters who would receive several thousand stingers, total," said one senior administration official who declined to be named. "Now

three of the countries were removed, and the numbers have been reduced to less than 10 percent of the original proposal."

The official said he believed leaked intelligence reports about the new shipments were part of an effort to derail the covert program by making it appear that several hundred Stingers represent a major escalation of U.S. arms deliveries.

Other insurgent groups slated in the original request to get the advanced weapons included resistance forces in Nicaragua and Cambodia, the official said, but he did not name the fifth country on the original list.

In a July 1985 speech before the United Nations, however, President Reagan said the United States is committed to supporting anti-communist forces in Ethiopia if diplomatic negotiations fail.

The official noted that the number of Stingers shipped to Jonas Savimbi's UNITA forces and Afghan mujahideen fighters will not provide enough military power to shoot down large numbers of armored Soviet helicopter gunships or ground attack jets.

"Although they are much more accurate than SAM-7s, the success rate of Stingers is 3 or 4 to 1 — it takes four Stingers to destroy a Hind or a MiG-23," the official said.

The Pentagon's latest assessment of Soviet military capabilities, published last week in Soviet Military Power, states that Soviet army deployments in Afghanistan have introduced new weapons systems "with greater mobility and increased lethality."

Besides adding several thousand "Spetsnaz" special forces troops, new Soviet equipment deliveries include new armored personnel carriers, multiple rocket launchers and self-propelled artillery.

"The introduction of these systems has largely offset recent improvements in mujahideen weaponry," the publication states.

One Senate source, who declined to be named, said pressure for supplying the Stingers came from a group of Senate conservatives.

APPEARED  
ALL

WASHINGTON POST  
31 March 1986

*Rowland Evans and Robert Novak*

# Stingers for Savimbi

A secret decision to send Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to Jonas Savimbi's anticommunist rebels in Angola is a breakthrough for the Reagan Doctrine.

It marks the first time in the long history of U.S. clandestine operations that a president has decided that top-of-the-line American weapons, not foreign-made castoffs, can be used to advance U.S. interests. The Stinger is at the very top. The shoulder-fired weapon can penetrate titanium-protected cockpits of Soviet MI-24 Hind helicopters, the gunships that control the battlefields of Angola as well as Nicaragua and Afghanistan.

The fact that previously skeptical Secretary of State George Shultz now is as enthusiastic about the Stinger as Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and CIA Director William Casey signals an end to prior restraints. That opens an important new chapter in the long struggle between the West and the Soviet Union where the ideological tide long has flowed for Moscow.

No other decision points up Reagan's heightened intent to bring to life his rhetoric that the West should be as committed to widening democracy as the Kremlin is committed to the spread of communism. Just how seriously this is taken is shown by the secret dispatch of the director of Central Intelligence to Pretoria to make sure the white South Africa government is not connected to covert U.S. help for Savimbi.

If the Stinger neutralizes the MI-24 "flying tanks" in Angola, it almost surely will be sent to anti-Sandinista guerrillas in Nicaragua once Congress finally approves Reagan's contra aid plan.

This represents a long path traveled by George Shultz, who started out skeptical about the whole idea of covert aid. When the secretary early in March journeyed up Pennsylvania Avenue for a crucial closed-door discussion of the aid program with Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole and several other Republican senators, he had previously agreed to the principle of anti-aircraft and antitank weapons for Savimbi.

Now, Shultz insisted that whatever covert aid was given, it must guarantee "sustainability" for Savimbi's rebellion. That is, it would do no good to give the rebels weapons that did not prevent their annihilation by some 30,000 Cubans and their Soviet advisers.

In a scheduled 45-minute session, which lasted twice that long, the senators persuaded him that only Stingers would do that. They correctly argued that the most valuable part of the MI-24 gunship is its Soviet-trained pilot, who would become vulnerable to the Stinger. Shultz agreed, and Reagan signed off on it.

But the president expressed special concern about what has always worried Shultz: the sub rosa alliance between South Africa and Savimbi. Reagan sought ways to insulate the U.S. aid program, particularly if sweetened with the potent Stinger, from any connection with the apartheid regime. He wanted South Africa, as one official told us, to be "hermetically sealed off" from any possible connection with the U.S. program.

That job, administration insiders told us, was accomplished by Casey himself. Although CIA officials never confirm or deny anything about their chief's travel schedule, it is known that Casey in mid-March spent several days in South Africa making Reagan's case.

Neither the Pretoria regime nor any South African nongovernment body

will have any connection with the new U.S. program. No U.S. covert aid will flow to Savimbi across the border of South Africa or Pretoria-controlled Namibia, which separates South Africa from Angola. That makes Zaire, a longtime friend of the United States, the necessary gateway for new weapons into Savimbi-controlled eastern Angola.

It is far too soon to know whether the famed Stinger will prove effective in the African bush against the flying tanks. But if it pays off, the decision to break a 40-year ban on the use of top-grade American weapons in covert competition with the Soviets could be of historic importance in pumping life into the Reagan Doctrine.

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ON PAGE 8, *See 1*

CHICAGO TRIBUNE  
31 March 1986

## Secret U.S. missile aid reported

WASHINGTON [AP]—The Reagan administration has begun covertly supplying sophisticated Stinger missiles to anticommunist rebels in Angola and Afghanistan, according to a report published Sunday.

The decision to supply Stinger heat-seeking antiaircraft missiles to the two insurgencies was made earlier this month and was kept secret among Reagan's national security advisers, said the Washington Post, quoting unidentified informed sources.

The weapons arrived in both countries last week, one source told the newspaper.

A spokesman for Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole [R., Kan.] said Saturday the covert aid was a topic of a March 5 meeting in his office attended by other conservative senators and Secretary of State George Shultz.

The spokesman, Walt Riker, said the senators recommended "that the freedom fighters be given effective aid that's going to help meet the reality of the opposition."

He said he did not know if the Stinger "was the highlight" of the meeting, but the Post reported that the meeting was the key event leading to the Stinger decision. The senators pressed Shultz to supply Stingers to Angolan rebel leader Jonas Savimbi and the Afghan rebels, the newspaper said.

In the past, the United States has barred shipments of U.S.-made weapons to insurgent forces in the Third World, shipping instead Soviet- and Chinese-made weapons purchased on the international arms market, the newspaper said.

The Stinger, manufactured by the General Dynamics Corp., is far more lethal than the Soviet SA7, which the United States has been supplying Afghan rebels. The Stinger has a range of up to five miles and is capable of homing in on heat emissions from aircraft engines.

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ON PAGE 23

## INTERNATIONAL

# Reagan Ready To Risk Ties With Soviets

## U.S. Reported to Have Sold Stinger Missiles to Rebels In Afghanistan, Angola

By FREDERICK KEMPE

*Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL*  
WASHINGTON — President Reagan is ready to risk short-term relations with the Soviet Union in order to defend two major parts of his foreign policy: space-weapons research and support for anticommunist guerrillas.

The president's commitment to these two policy lines was underlined by reports that the Reagan administration has been supplying several hundred sophisticated air-defense weapons—shoulder-held Stinger missiles—to anticommunist insurgents in Angola and Afghanistan, and by Mr. Reagan's almost immediate dismissal of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's latest call for a nuclear-testing ban.

"The president is committed to both these diplomatic tracks," a senior administration official says, noting that they were the only foreign-policy matters mentioned in his second inaugural address.

The official says President Reagan is consciously avoiding what he considers mistakes of previous administrations, which the president asserts made concessions and pre-cooked agreements with the Soviets in order to please them ahead of summit meetings.

### Strict Verification

The official also says Mr. Reagan isn't willing to join a nuclear-testing moratorium without strict measures of verification agreed to by both parties. And he is reluctant to stop testing related to the Strategic Defense Initiative, or Star Wars, program.

Mr. Reagan also believes his policies of increased support for guerrillas have played an important role in "turning back Soviet advances in the Third World and making them think twice before taking actions in the Third World."

U.S. officials hope increased support for Afghan guerrillas also might force swifter

Soviet compromises at the United Nations-sponsored negotiations aimed at bringing about a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Senior officials say they believe that a steady White House course on these issues might increase tensions during the short run with Moscow, thus delaying the second Reagan-Gorbachev meeting that Washington had hoped for this summer. They say, however, that they believe Mr. Gorbachev would attend a second superpower summit before the end of the year and that long-term relations would become more stable.

However, Moscow hasn't given any indication that it would delay a second summit.

The administration has said that when President Reagan took office, the two most destabilizing foreign-policy problems were the strategic nuclear buildup and Moscow's engagements—direct and indirect—in the Third World. The White House argues that the SDI program and the support for anticommunist guerrillas, together known as the Reagan Doctrine, address these problems and thus will lead to longer-term stability in the two countries' relations.

Weekend reports, confirmed by sources with access to the information, told of a change of policy reached about a month ago by the president's national security advisers to deliver insurgents Stinger missiles.

White House sources declined to comment on the reports. The guerrillas had previously been sent mainly Soviet and Chinese-made weapons bought on the international arms market or from U.S. allies so the U.S. could deny its support for the insurgents.

### Gorbachev Proposal

Another weekend development was Mr. Reagan's rejection of Mr. Gorbachev's proposal for a summit meeting in Europe on the nuclear-testing issue separate from a U.S.-Soviet summit. Mr. Gorbachev argued in a televised speech that the next summit needs to focus on more general questions.

He also warned that the Soviet Union would end its seven-month unilateral moratorium on nuclear-weapons testing if the U.S. carries out another test, which it plans for April.

The decision to provide guerrillas with the Stingers overcame opposition by some State Department officials and sectors of the intelligence community. They, along with Pakistani diplomats, privately say they fear additional support for Afghan rebels might cause the Soviets to carry

fighting over the Pakistani border more often or increase Moscow's efforts to support Pakistani internal turmoil.

The senior administration official says—without confirming the delivery of the missiles—that the administration policy is to respond to the increase of "the quality and quantity of Soviet military supplies in both cases."

He specifically cites the recent Soviet introduction into Afghanistan of 240-millimeter mortars that can rout guerrillas in small valleys, and low-flying aircraft that have significantly increased Soviet front-line reconnaissance capabilities.

"There is certainly a great desire of the administration in both cases to make our support more effective," the official says.

Some American diplomats have argued that there is an unspoken connection between the level of U.S. weapons for anti-communist guerrillas and the Soviet backing for communist insurgents. Hence, they fear that escalation in Angola or Afghanistan could be followed by mirror measures by the Soviets in such places as El Salvador.

A senior official, however, says President Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan favors the increased support, or else the U.S. wouldn't be able to provide it.

# Reagan's plan to give small missiles to rebels sparks security concerns

By Peter Grier

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Last week, Sen. Dennis DeConcini started getting phone calls from top Reagan administration officials. They wanted to talk about Stinger antiaircraft missiles.

The Stinger is a lethal weapon, and the Arizona Democrat did not think the "contras" fighting the Sandinista government in Nicaragua should be allowed to have it. He had prepared an amendment to the contra-aid bill that would have prevented such a transfer.

But after a call from the President, among others, the amendment was quietly dropped.

As this incident shows, the shoulder-fired Stinger is now a weapon of controversy in Washington. Sending Stingers to insurgents symbolizes a level of United States support that makes some officials nervous — and that others applaud.

The administration has now decided to send Stingers to antigovernment forces in Angola and Afghanistan, according to widespread reports. This move has long been urged by factions within the Central Intelligence

Agency and Congress, which feel the capable Stingers are the only way to counterbalance Soviet-supplied helicopter gunships.

Stingers look like World War II-era bazookas that have grown up. Fired by one soldier, they can travel up to 3 miles cross-country and hit targets 4,500 feet off the ground. Their sensitive heat-seeking "eyes" can even spot aircraft from the front, when hot tailpipes are out of sight.

This is a top-of-the-line US weapon, and until now it has been available only to the trusted few. Besides NATO allies and other developed pro-US nations such as Japan, Stingers have been sold only to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, according to State Department officials.

There are "substantive questions of security" involved in sending Stingers to other countries that might want them, a State Department official says.

"We would not export stuff like that to El Salvador, for instance," says this official. The Salvadorean military is not exactly famous for tight discipline, and if Stingers fell into the hands of anti-government rebels, "they might shoot down President Duarte's helicopter."

Saudi Arabia, before it got its first batch of Stingers, had to agree to security procedures detailed by the US. According to documents outlining the agreement, the

Saudis must store the Stinger's two main parts — launcher and missile — in two separate areas.

Each area must have a full-time guard force and be surrounded by a fence a minimum of 6 feet high. Storage buildings must have steel vault doors, each secured by two padlocks. US personnel will inspect security arrangements annually, according to the documents. All maintenance of Stinger internal systems must be done under US control.

If Reagan officials have really decided to send Stingers to the mujahideen in Afghanistan, and Jonas Savimbi's anti-communist rebels in Angola, then they

must have changed their minds about the missile's sensitivity, congressional critics say. "Do we seriously think there are safeguards like the Saudis have in the mountains of Afghanistan?" asks one Senate aide.

A large percentage of arms sent to the Afghan rebels end up on the black market in Peshawar, Pakistan. The rebels themselves sometimes provide the wares to raise hard cash, according to the aide.

Purloined Stingers would be "the ultimate terrorist weapons," another congressional aide says.

Easy to use, easy to hide, the missiles would enable terrorist groups to supplement airport terminal attacks with strikes at civilian planes in the air, this aide says.

In addition, he claims, their presence in rebel hands would strip away the last vestiges of secrecy about US aid in Angola and Afghanistan.

Other experts say the terrorist potential of Stingers is somewhat exaggerated. The Soviets' most advanced similar weapon, the SA-7B, is widely available in third-world nations, they point out.

When the Israelis occupied PLO headquarters in Beirut, they discovered "thousands" of SA-7Bs still in crates, says Robert Kupperman, a terrorism expert at

Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Though it can only spot a plane when it can see its hot exhaust, and though its batteries tend to go dead, the SA-7B could shoot down a civilian airliner, Mr. Kupperman says. It probably couldn't shoot down a jet fighter, as Stingers could — "but terrorists aren't too interested in F-15s," he says.

The Stinger issue may yet be explicitly debated in Congress. Rep. Lee H. Hamilton (D) of Indiana, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, has called for open congressional discussion of aid to Angola and Afghanistan.

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# Office of Current Production and Analytic Support

## CIA Operations Center

### News Bulletin

: The Baltimore Sun, Page 2A

2 April 1986  
Item No. 2

## CIA is said to have overrated yields of Soviet nuclear tests

New York Times News Service

WASHINGTON — The Central Intelligence Agency has changed its procedures for estimating the yield of large Soviet nuclear tests because it has decided its previous estimates were too high, Reagan administration officials said yesterday.

The officials said the decision to use the new method was made in January by William J. Casey, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, despite objections from some Defense Department officials.

The CIA decision has raised questions about past administration assertions that the Soviet Union had probably violated the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974.

Mr. Casey formally approved the change Jan. 21, officials said.

Administration experts, who asked not to be identified, were divided about whether the change should lead the administration to

drop its allegations against the Soviet Union.

The accusations of Soviet arms-control violations have become a central issue in U.S.-Soviet relations.

The Reagan administration is deliberating what actions to take in response to reported arms-control violations and in considering whether to modify its commitment not to undercut the 1979 Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty.

The administration has said that many of the Soviet tests had "likely" violated the threshold treaty, which stipulates that the size of warheads being tested should not exceed 150 kilotons, equal to the explosive force of 150,000 tons of TNT.

The Soviet Union has denied violating the treaty.

But administration and non-governmental experts have long questioned the accuracy of the intelligence estimates on which those charges were based.

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# Office of Current Production and Analytic Support

## CIA Operations Center

News Bulletin : The New York Times, Page A1

2 April 1986  
Item No. 4

## C.I.A. CHANGES WAY THAT IT MEASURES SOVIET ATOM TESTS

### U.S. CHARGES QUESTIONED

Readings Will Be Lower and  
Officials Debate Issue of  
Past Russian Cheating

By MICHAEL R. GORDON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 1 — The Central Intelligence Agency has changed its procedures for estimating the yield of large Soviet nuclear tests because it has decided its previous estimates were too high, Reagan Administration officials said today.

The officials said the decision to use the new method was made in January by William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, despite objections from some Defense Department officials.

#### Reagan Requests a Report

The C.I.A. decision has raised questions about past Administration assertions that the Soviet Union had probably violated the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, which limits underground tests to no more than 150 kilotons.

Before the C.I.A. decision was made, President Reagan ordered a report on how the change would affect Administration concerns about Soviet Union violations, the Administration officials said. That report has not yet been completed.

Mr. Casey formally approved the change on Jan. 21, officials said. Experts familiar with the change say it will lower estimates of the yield of Soviet tests by about 20 percent.

#### No White House Comment

Richard N. Perle, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, reportedly opposed adopting the recommendations and argued that the issue needed more study. Mr. Perle declined to discuss the issue.

Edward P. Djerejian, a White House spokesman, said the White House had

no comment at this time on the decision and its implications.

Administration experts, who asked not to be identified, were divided about whether the change should lead the Administration to drop its allegations against the Soviet Union.

The accusations of Soviet arms control violations has become a central issue in United States-Soviet relations. No significant progress has been made in this area since the November summit meeting President Reagan and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the Soviet leader.

#### Deliberations Over Treaty

The Reagan Administration is currently deliberating over what actions to take in response to reported arms control violations and in considering whether to modify its commitment not to undercut the 1979 Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty.

The Administration has said that many of the Soviet tests had "likely" violated the threshold treaty, which stipulates that the size of warheads being tested should not exceed 150 kilotons, equal to the explosive force of 150,000 tons of TNT. The Soviet Union has denied violating the treaty.

But Administration and nongovernmental experts have long questioned the accuracy of the intelligence estimates on which those charges were based.

The debate has centered on the seismicological procedures for assessing the yield of nuclear tests. The main Soviet test site at Semipalatinsk in Central Asia is older and more geologically stable than the site in Nevada where the United States conducts its tests.

#### Larger Wave Is Produced

Scientists say Soviet explosions produce a larger sound wave through the earth than American tests of the same size.

While Government intelligence estimates of Soviet tests have long been adjusted to take this into account, experts have questioned whether the adjustment factor was large enough.

Officials said the question of changing the United States estimating procedure has been under review and study for years

#### New Studies Come to Light

The issue came to the fore again last year after several new studies.

Last Oct. 18, a panel of scientists selected by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency prepared a classified report that concluded that Government's method for estimating the yield of Soviet explosions was based on faulty assumptions.

The eight-member panel recommended a change in procedures that would lower the estimates.

The panel's report was submitted in late October to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, which issues reports on the size of foreign nuclear explosions. The committee is made up of members from the military services and intelligence agencies.

#### Second Study Adds Support

Adding support to the scientists' recommendation was a separate study, also completed in October, that was overseen by the Air Force Technical Applications Center, which operates a system of seismic stations to monitor Soviet tests. This study agreed with the finding of the military research agency report.

On Dec. 17, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee recommended that the C.I.A. adopt the advice in the report commissioned by the research agency. Officials said the Defense Intelligence Agency disagreed, but was overruled.

The new C.I.A. procedure will be used to estimate the size of explosions in the Shagan River area of Semipalatinsk, where the Soviet Union conducts its largest nuclear tests. Officials said they expected the new estimating procedure to be applied to the next Soviet test in this area. The Soviet Union has not held a nuclear test since last summer, when it declared a unilateral moratorium on tests and asked the United States to join in a total test ban.

What the new procedure means about past Administration allegations about Soviet cheating is unclear.

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#### Reagan Signs Directive

At the time the Administration prepared its report to Congress charging Soviet arms control violations, President Reagan signed a National Security Decision Directive, NSDD-202, that asked for a report on how the new method would reflect on past United States charges of violations by the Soviet Union.

This is the report that has not been completed, and officials are divided about whether the Russians have been violating the treaty.

Officials said applying the new method retroactively would still leave about a dozen Soviet tests that appear to be above the limit, although one official said that three or four of these exceeded the limit enough to warrant special concern.

The new procedure also suggests that the largest Soviet blast since the signing of the threshold treaty in 1974 was no higher than 250 kilotons. The Administration has previously said that the Soviet Union has conducted a test that was greater than 300 kilotons.

#### Violations Still 'Likely'

One Administration official said the new data still point "in the direction of a likely violation" and noted that the Administration qualified its charges against the Soviet Union.

But another official said the change in the estimating procedure would significantly undercut the charges.

He said that given the uncertainty involved in seismic measurements, it was usual to expect some Soviet tests to appear to exceed the 150-kiloton limit. He added that some American tests that are under that limit may also appear to the Soviets to exceed the limit.

A spokesman for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency said the agency was "not in a position to put forward any official agency view on this matter at this time."

#### Some Longstanding Questions

While officials familiar with the C.I.A. decision declined to be quoted on the record, other experts have openly supported the view that some estimates of the yield of Soviet tests have been too high.

Roger Batzel, the director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, in California, said in written testimony to Congress yet to made public that the Soviet Union might be complying with the treaty.

"Based on our assessment of the relationship between yield and seismic magnitude for the Soviet test site and the pattern of Soviet testing," he said. "We have concluded that the Soviets appear to be observing a yield limit. Our best estimate of this yield limit is consistent" with the threshold test ban. "However," he added, "the seismic data are subject to considerable statistical uncertainty."

That view differs from officials at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, in New Mexico, who have told Congress that verification of the threshold treaty is highly uncertain.

But a retired admiral, Sylvester R. Foley Jr., the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs at the Energy Department, which oversees nuclear testing, said in an interview that he tended to agree with Mr. Batzel's assessment.

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